Journal of the Minnesota Academy of Science
Volume 54

Number 2

Article 3

1989

Global Agricultural Trade Negotiations and Their Potential Impact
on Minnesota
Mark Ritchie
Minnesota Department of Agriculture

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.morris.umn.edu/jmas
Part of the Agricultural Economics Commons, and the International Relations Commons

Recommended Citation
Ritchie, M. (1989). Global Agricultural Trade Negotiations and Their Potential Impact on Minnesota.
Journal of the Minnesota Academy of Science, Vol. 54 No.2, 4-9.
Retrieved from https://digitalcommons.morris.umn.edu/jmas/vol54/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Minnesota Morris Digital
Well. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of the Minnesota Academy of Science by an authorized editor of
University of Minnesota Morris Digital Well. For more information, please contact skulann@morris.umn.edu.

Global Agricultural Trade Negotiations and
Their Potential Impact on Minnesota
MARK RITCHIE

The two main factors determining the financial well-being
of our family farm ers, market prices and government
payments, are primarily established by Congress through
federal legislation, commonly called the Farm Bill. Although
these two factors are likely to remain the main economic
ingredients in Minnesota's farm economy for the f01·seeable
future, the political control over these issues appears to be
shifting out of the hands of Congress and into the hands of
our international trade negotiators. For the very first time, all
price support, income subsidy, and supply management
programs are on the table for alteration or elimination in this
new "Uruguay Round" of General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) negotiations.

Given the large role that agriculture
plays in Minnesota's economy, a shift in
control of farm policy from Congress to
trade negotiators in Geneva could have
profound implications for Minnesotans.
The GATT agreement, first ratified in 1947, is one of the
post-war global economic institutions, like the World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund. It serves as both a "code
of conduct" for international businesses, and as an international arbiter regulating government intervention in world
trade.
In the past, GATT trade talks have focused almost exclusively on the rules and regulations for tariffs, quotas, and other
regulatory practices. Domestic farm policy, including the
rules that food processors and exporters must follow when
buying farmer's crops, have been strictly internal political
matt ers, not subject to GATT or any oth er external
negotiations.
In a break with this tradition, however, the 1986 meeting
of GATT negotiators at Punta de Este, Uruguay, agreed to
expand their talks beyond the rules of international trade to
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include domestic farm policies as well. The delegation from
the United States, which included Minnesota Congressman
Bill Frenzel, was the major force behind this expansion of
GATT authority.
At a press conference in 1988 following a visit to the GATT
headquarters in Geneva, Mi nnesota Senator Boschwitz
stunned U.S. agricultural leaders with his prediction that "the
1990 US. Farm Bill will be written here, in Geneva (1) ."
Reagan Administration Agriculture Secretary Richard Lyng, a
leader in the effort to shift control over US. farm policy, stated
that the 1990 Farm Bill will depend "on what the results in
1990 are of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations (2). "
Given the large role that agriculture plays in Minnesota's
economy, a shift in control of farm policy from Congress to
trade negotiators in Geneva could have profound implications for Minnesotans.

The Major GAIT Proposals
There are two major GATT agricultural proposals with
potential significant impact on Minnesota. The first, often
called the "global de-coupling" plan, was proposed by the
Reagan administration in July of 1987. Daniel Amstutz, a
former executive with Minnesota's Cargill Grain Corporation,
was instrumental in drafting this proposal and has the job of
lobbying for it in Geneva at the GATT talks.
This "de-coupling" proposal calls for a ten-year plan to
deregulate global agricultural trade, including the phase out
of almost all farm programs, the e limination of import
regulations (including a GATT waiver which legalizes most
U.S. food import control measures), and a ban on all direct
and indirect export subsidies including deficiency payments,
restitutions, and export enhancement programs. In the press
release announcing his proposal, President Reagan described
it as "the elimination, over a ten-year period, of all export
subsidies, all barriers to each other's markets (including
tariffs and quotas) , and all domestic subsidies that affect trade
(3). "
In addition, Amstutz has proposed that "all ministers agree
to modifY the General Agreement specifically in order to
eliminate all country specific exceptions, waivers, etc.;
strengthen the GATT for the purpose of harmonizing health
and sanitary measures; and remove the ability of countries to
restrict expons in times of critical food shortages ( 4)."
The second major proposal, from the European Community (EC), focused on specific agricultural trade problems,
including chronic low prices, over-production, and the
destructive effects of "dumping" surplus production onto
world markets. The EC proposal called for international
journal of the Minnesota Academy o f Science

negotiations to establish minimum "reference prices" and to
find solutions to market share trade wars. Internal farm
policies, including the right of countries to protect their
domestic agriculture through import controls would not be
significantly altered under the European proposal.

Impact of the "De-Coupling" Proposal on Minnesota's Family Farmers
The "de coupling" proposal, including the phase out of
price support and deficiency payment programs would
reduce both farm prices and government payments resulting
in lower net farm income. Eliminating impon controls which
now protect Minnesota's dairy, beef, pork, sugar beet, fresh
fruit and vegetable, wheat, oilseed, and barley producers
could reduce both in -state and out-of-state sales of
Minnesota-grown products. This "de-coupling" proposal may
open up some foreign markets for Minnesota-grown products, but Canada may be the only country where we have a
real opponunity to expand sales. For most potential new
foreign markets, other nations or regions of the United States
are e ither geographically closer, or they are lower cost
producers.

Impact on Farm Income
The cornerstone of the U.S. proposal to GATT is the
elimination of domestic farm price support programs in order
to lower farm prices to "market-clearing" levels. Minnesota
Senator Boschwitz, the major congressional supporter of this
"decoup ling" approach, has estimated that government price
support levels would need to be lowered from the current
$1.70 per bushel of corn to "$1.00 or less per bushel of corn,
and to correspondingly lower rates on other crops (5). "
Senator Boschwitz has already introduced domestic "decoupling" legislation (S.1725) in suppon of the U.S. GATT
plan, wh ich would set prices at $1.30 per bushel for corn,
$1.60 for wheat, and $3.50 for soybeans. These could be
lowered by an additional 5 percent per year at the discretion
of the Secretary of Agriculture.
Assessing the total impact of Sentor Boschwitz's "decoupling" legislation on the income of all Minnesota's 90,000
crop, livestock, and dairy farmers would require much more
space than this anicle permits. However, by taking a close
look at the impact on the grains and oilseeds sector, which
represent nearly half of Minnesota's total farm receipts, the
potential total effect can be seen. The annual loss on these
crops alone (exclusive of government payments), would be
$2.261 billion (Table 1) . Net losses over the six years of the
program, including government payments, would be almost
$9 billion.
Senator Boschwitz has recognized that a drop in farm
income of this magnitude would be devastating to the entire
state. To cushion this blow, his legislation includes "equity"
payments to farmers, paid out of the U.S. treasury. These
welfare-type "equity" payments would cost almost $5 billion
in Minnesota alone over the next six years (Table 2).
There are ways to reduce some of the negative effects of
this proposed legislation, but not without significant cost to
either the agri-input industries or to taxpayers. For example,
farme rs could reduce their purchases of fertilizers and
chemicals in order to lower their costs of production, but this
would mean a loss of sales to our agri-input manufacturers,
wholesalers, and retailers. Another possibility is that the state
government could choose to directly supplement farm
income as th e Vermont legislature voted for their dairy
farm ers in 1988. This wo uld be expensive, but not
inconceivable.
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Impact on Exports
The U.S. proposal would affect Minnesota's commodity
exports and imports in three important ways. First, the
proposed lower market prices could reduce the net value of
our exports. Second, the phasing out of all import barriers and
import quota agreements would alter U.S. access to markets
which are now guaranteed to U.S farmers, like the Japanese
beef market. Third, the proposed ban on export subsidies
could severely affect Minnesota wheat exports, which are now
heavily dependent on the Export Enhancement Program
subsidies. Over 60 percent of all Minnesota wheat exports this
last year were shipped with the assistance of direct export
subsidies.

Given U.S.D.A. estimates that each $1
billion drop in the value of farm
exports equals the loss of 20,000 jobs,
the negative impact of these price cuts
on the broader Minnesota economy
would be devastating.
Price inelasticity of most agricultural exports means that
while price cuts might boost the volume of exports, they will
most likely cause a drop in net expmt values. For example,
deep price cuts helped U.S. grain corporations ship one
billion more bushels of corn, wheat, and soybeans in 1987
compared to 1986. Yet the total value of these exports fell by
over $400,000,000 (6). The additional price cuts proposed
under "de-coupling" may cause an even further drop in tarm
exp01t earnings. Given U.S.D.A. estimates that each $1 billion
drop in the value of farm exports equals the loss of 20,000
jobs, the negative impact of these price cuts on the broader
Minnesota economy would be devastating.
The actual impact of abolishing import barriers on a global
basis would be largely determined by the rise and fall of
foreign currency in relation to the dollar. In the case of major
crops where Minnesota now excels (such as corn, wheat, and
soybeans) , there are some markets where we are competitive
in quality and price. However, in a number of instances,
abolishing all im port barriers is likely to benefit other
exporting countries more than the U.S. For example, if]apan
actually opens its markets for more imported beef, Australia
and Canada would be the most likely to benefit. Australia is
much closer to Japan than the U.S. and Canadian beef is
currently cheaper due to the lack of parity between the U.S.
and Canadian dollar.
The Canadian market is perhaps the only place where
Minnesota could significantly expand exports in a totally deregulated world market. Unfortunately, the U.S. crops that will
be the most competitive in Canada, like fresh fruits and
vegetables, are those which are grown in the warmer climates
of California, Texas, and Florida. For these labor intensive
crops, however, wage differentials and less strict environmental regulations will mean that Mexico or the Caribbean are
most likely to benefit if Canada ended all import controls.
Minnesota may not end up being cost competitive in very
many crops due to currency differe ntials that now exist
between countries.
Perhaps the element of the U.S proposal which would most
affect Minnesota is the proposed ban on export subsidies.
Minnesota's number three export crop, wheat, is heavily
dependent on export subsidies such as the Export Enhancement Program (EEP). Wheat that costs Minnesota farmers
$150 per ton to produce is being sold to the Soviets for
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Table 1. Impact of Proposed "De-Coupling" on Major Minnesota Crops*

Crop

Corn
Barley
Oats
Soybeans
Wheat

Cost of
Production

Proposed
Proposed
" De-coupling" Equity Payments
Prices
(First Year)

Loss
Per Bushel

Total Bushels
Produced
(1986 crop)

(dollars
per bushel)

(dollars
per bushel)

(dollars
per bushel)

(dollars)

3.00
2.74
2.33
6.80
4.81

1.30
1.20
.90
3.50
1.60

1.04
.90
.60
.80
1.35

.66
.64
.83
2.50
1.86

707,600,000
55,000,000
43,350,000
170,400,000
103,666,000

Total Loss Per Year
Total Loss for 6 Years**

Total Loss
Total Loss
Without " Equity" Including " Early"
Payments
Payments
(millions
of dollars)

(millions
of dollars)

1,202
85
62
578
333

467
35
36
426
193

2,260
13,560

1,157
8,778

*Production volume figures are from 1986. Cost of production estimates are from the Minnesota Area Vocational Technical Institutes, North Dakota
State University, and Ohio State University. " De-coupling" price levels are from S-1725, "de-coupling" legislation (corn, soy, wheat), and computed
equivalents (oats, barley).
**Equity payments for soybeans are reduced by 20 percent each year, while all others are reduced by 10 percent

roughly $80 per ton. Soybean and sunflower oil exports, also
important to Minnesota, are heavily subsidized through the
EEP as well.
Although it is impossible to predict the total impact on
Minnesota exports, if export subsidies are abolished, it would
be clearly substantial. In addition to the farmers affected, a
large number of transport, storage, and handling companies
are dependent on farm exports for their survival, including
the Port of Duluth.

Impact on Imports
Another important aspect of" de-coupling" is the proposal
to abolish all import barriers. This would have a negative
impact on Minnesota crops now protected by import quotas,
tariffs and other regulations, including, our sugar beet, beef,
daity, grain, oilseed, and fresh produce farmers. For example,
the cost of production for Minnesota's sugar beet producers
is over 14 cents per pound. This compares to roughly 8 cents
per pound in the Caribbean. Even if transportation costs were
as high as four cents per pound, Minnesota's producers would
have to take a significant cut in income to be price competitive under a total "free market" situation.
Even more damaging to Minnesota's sugar producers
would be the impact of lowering corn prices to $1.30 per
bushel , as Senator Boschwitz has proposed in his "decoupling" legislation. Although the cost of production of corn
is $3.00 per bushel, the 1985 Farm Bill lowered corn prices
to roughly $1.80 per bushel, making it possible for corn syrup
sweeteners (HFCS) to be manufactured at prices below the
production cost of sugar. This prompted the carbonated
beverage industry and other large sweetener users to shift
entirely away from sugar to cheaper corn sweeteners. If corn
prices are lowered again it becomes even cheaper and easier
to use HFCS as a sugar substitute. With several thousand
Minnesota sugar beet farmers and 14,000 sugar beet factory
workers at risk, the statewide impact of destroying this
industry would be substantial.
As with sugar, there are regions of the world where many
of Minnesota's key crops can be produced at a lower cost,
including milk in New Zealand, wheat in Argentina, soybeans
in Brazil, and beef in Costa Rica. In addition, currency
manipulations can make it advantageous for U.S. food
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Table 2. Taxpayer Costs of "Equity" Payments to Minnesota
Farmers as Stipulated in S-1725 "De-Coupling" Legislation
Amount/ bu.

Corn
$1.04
.90
Barley
Oats
.60
Soybeans
.80
Wheat
1.35

Year One
Total Production
(in bushels based on
1986)
707,600,000
55,000,000
43,350,000
170,400,000
103,666,000

Total " Equity"
Payments
$735,904,000
49,500,000
26,010,000
136,320,000
139,949,000

Year 1 Total
Year 2*
Year3
Year4
Year5
Year6

$1 ,087,683,000
965,283,000
842,283,000
720,483,000
598,083,000
475,683,000

Total Costs

4,689,498,000

* Each year total reflects a 20 percent reduction in soybean payments
and 10 percent reduction in all other crop payments.

processors or meatpackers to import foods from countries
where the costs of production are the same or slightly higher.
The abolishing of U.S import controls could dramatically
accelerate substitution of foreign-grown products for a
number of Minnesota's major crops and livestock products.

Impact of Europe's GATT Proposal on Minnesota's Family Farmers
If GATT were to adopt the European Community's proposal, the major impact would be the setting of minimum
"reference" prices for major export commodities, including
sugar, dairy, and cereals, and the maintanance of most
existing import controls. In addition, there would be
international negotiations to establish market share arrangements among the major exporting countries (7).
j ournal of the Minnesota Academv of Science

Impact on Farm Income
Although the EC proposal does not stipulate the precise
levels of prices to be established, they often refer to the need
to maintain export prices at levels equal to or above the cost
of production. This would mean U.S. grown wheat would be
exported at around $4.80 per bushel, corn for around $3.00,
and soybeans at nearly $7.00 per bushel. These prices are
roughly equal to the levels we have seen since the 1988
drought. Minnesota farm income based on the EC proposal
would be over $1 billion per year higher than under the
Boschwitz "de-coupling" proposal (Table 3).

Impact on Exports
At the price levels recommended by the EC, the value of
Minnesota's farm exports would be significantly higher, even
though there could be some decline in export volume. For
example, even with a 25 percent drop in trade volume, the
higher prices in the EC proposal would result in approximately 50 percent growth in Minnesota farm export earnings.
The Food and Agriculture Policy Research Institute (FAPRI)
at Iowa State has estimated that price elasticity of the exports
of these crops is relatively small, which has been proven true
by the recent drought experience. In 1985, FAPRI estimated
price level impacts on the volume and value of corn exports
as follows.
Corn exports priced at $4.71 per bushel would sell 1.64
bi~lion bushels, for a total of7.7 billion dollars. Corn exports
pnced at $2.63 per bushel would only increase export volume
to 2.14 billion bushels, resulting in a decline of export
earning to 5.6 billion dollars (8)."
The total sales volume of commodities which are priced at
their full cost of production is logically going to be lower than
when they are being sold at half price. However, for the most
part, food demand is quite inelastic and responds little to
price changes. One of the reasons is that modern intensive
livestock industries need an uninterrupted flow of corn and
soybeans. Since the U.S. supplies roughly half of the world's
soybean exports and 70 percent of the world's corn exports,
~e are and will remain the primary source of supply for most
tmporters who are unable or unwilling to produce their own
feed.

Table 3. Impact of EC Proposal on Annual Minnesota Farm
Income and Comparison to Income Under "De-Coupling."
Production
(Bushels
Based on
1986)
Corn
Barley
Oats
Soybeans
Wheat

707,600,000
55,000,000
43,350,000
170,400,000
103,666,000

Estimated
Revenue at
Cost of Production
Prices Under
Cost of
Production
EC Proposal
(dollars per bushel) Prices (Millions)
3.00
2.74
2.33
6.80
4.81

2,123
151
101
1,159
499

Revenue Estimate under EC Proposal
Estimated Revenue Under S. 1725 (de-coupling)*
Net Gain Under EC Proposal

4,033
2,875
1,158

* Crop revenue plus "equity" payments during the first year. In each

subsequent year the "equity" payments would decline, further
widening the difference between the U.S. and EC proposals.
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Motivations Behind the Shift of Policymaking
from Washington to Geneva
For

ov~r

50 years, Congress has jealously and successfully
domestic agricultural policy, granting
only hm!ted d1scret10nary authority to the Secretary of
Agnculture. Although there have been numerous attempts by
the executive branch to seize more control over farm policy,
these have been relatively unsuccessful.
guard~d 1~s pow~r ove.r

The President can bargain away any
domestic farm programs he chooses as
part of a larger trade package, which
then can only be either approved or
rejected by Congress without
amendment.
Most recently, the Reagan Administration was unsuccessful
in its attempt to eliminate a number of farm price support,
supply management, and acreage set-aside programs.
Through the GATT negotiations, however, these sweeping
changes could be achieved without the explicit agreement of
Congress. Under the current "fast track" authorization
proce?ure, the President will put a completed trade agreement m front of Congress for an "up or down" vote. Under
the ~xpanded authority of the current GATT negotiations, the
Prestdent can bargain away any domestic farm programs he
choo~es as part of a larger trade package, which then can only
be etther approved or rejected by Congress without
amendment.
Another major motivation for shifting power to trade
negotiators is the hope that the current GATT negotiations
can be used as a "big stick" to bring about changes in the
domestic farm policies of other countries that have long been
sought by U.S.-based grain trading corporations. For example,
a number of Third World nations now regulate food imports
to protect and encourage their own farmers, and to conserve
foreign currency earnings.
The Reagan Administration has taken the position that food
deficit n~tions should not attempt to grow more food by
encouragmg and protecting their farmers, but should instead
buy more food from the United States. President Reagan's first
Secretary of Agriculture, John Block, summarized this view
"the push by some developing countries to become self:
sufficient in food production may be a remnant of a by-gone
era . Those countries could save money by importing more of
the1r food from the United States (9)."
In addition to the Reagan Administration's desire to win
changes in both U.S. and foreign agricultural policies, a third
motivation behind its efforts to take more control over farm
policymaking is the fact that Democrats are likely to maintain
control over the House and Senate for many years. According
to Jonathan Hirsch, columnist for Farm Futures and respected
observer of agricultural politics at the national level,
Republican officials believe that they must win significant
cha?ges in in~ernational trade rules in order to make it very
dtfftcult for e1ther Congress or a future Democrat president
to reverse the "free market" direction they have pursued over
the past decade (10).

Likely Outcome of the GATT Negotiations
Although it is impossible to predict which of these two
competing proposals will win, it is possible to analyze the
7

various forces lined up on both sides of this debate to
evaluate the possible outcome.
The U.S. proposal has received a vety mixed reaction at
home and abroad. Although heavily supported by agribusiness and some members of Congress, the Reagan plan has
had a difficult time generating support from even some of the
traditional supporters of the Administration's farm policies.
Only a very few members of the House and Senate Agriculture
Committees have publically endorsed the plan.
In addition, a majority of the general farm organizations,
including the National Farmers Union, National Farmers
Organization , American Agriculture Movement , and a
number of the commodity organizations have come out
strongly against it. For example, a large number of commodity
organizations, soybean, potatoes, barley, and durum groups
have signed a joint resolution calling for a slowdown in the
GATT negotiations. In their words, "Although the undersigned suppOLt the continued negotiations at the interim
review of GATT in Montreal in December of 1988, they also
deem it extremely important that no agreements, understandings, or commitments to direction be signed or verbally
committed until the full impact of the 1988 drought can be
properly assessed next year. "
In addition to strong farmer opposition, a number of other
groups, including churches, some trade unions, environmental groups, and civil rights organizations have come out
against the U.S. plan. Citing the serious negative impacts of
the "de-coupling" plan on the farmers and food security in
the Third World, the National Council of Churches condemned the U.S. GATT proposal because it would
"significantly add to world food disorder. First of all, the
demand to phase out farm price support programs
would mean an immediate and disastrous drop in farm
prices, resulting in a dramatic fall in farm family income.
As a result, all current trends, including displacement of
farmers, concentration of land control, and corporate
control over agricultural resources would accelerate. As
in the past, these falling prices will most likely lead to
even greater surplus production as farmers attempt to
boost yields to make up for falling prices."
The second demand, to eliminate all import barriers,
is perhaps the most devastating. It would abolish the
right of Third World nations to protect their borders
from subsidized exports (i.e., dumping). If rich nations
can sell their crops at below the cost of production in
the domestic markets of the Third World, they can
destroy many or most of the local farmers who will be
unable to sell into their own markets.
If surplus producing countries are prohibited from
implementing import barriers, effective supply management would become impossible. Further overproduction would result, fo llowed by export dumping to
dispose of the surpluses. Such dumping would both
harm food producers in poor countries and depress
global prices, reducing the export earnings of Third
World producers of similar commodities ( 11 ). "
More important than domestic reactions, however, has
been the growing opposition at the international level. The
Agriculture Minister of Mexico, Eduardo Pesquera, for
example, criticized the U.S. proposal for being insensitive to
the crisis facing food deficit nations of the Third World. He
stated that "The U.S. plan to end all trade-distorting farm
subsidies by the year 2000 will not work because of the huge
gap in economic devel opment between rich and poor
8

countries. ( 12 ). "Even the Australian government, one of the
strongest supponers of trade liberalization has called the U.S.
plan "fairyland. "
In response to some of this criticism, the U.S. proposal has
been altered to include permission for those governments
who can afford it, to provide direct welfare-type assistance to
their farmers. This assistance could be in the form of decoupling "transition payments" which would be phased out
over five years or less.
Support for the U.S. position did improve with the victory
by the Conservative Party in Canada's recent nat io nal
elections. However, this victory belies the actual level of
public support in Canada for the elimination of trade barriers.
The Conservatives won only 45 percent of the popular vote.
Togeth er, the Liberals and the New Democrats won 54
percent of the vote. While the U.S. may currently enjoy
Canadian government suppOLt for its proposal, future support
will not be dependable.
Two key developments have greatly enhanced the position
of the European proposal. The first was the solid support
offered byJapan. With only three powerful forces in GATT, the
U.S.,Japan, and Europe, a coalition between Japan and the EC
is quite formidable.
The second development is th e victory by President
Francois Mitterand in the French elections. With his selection
of socialist Michel Rocard as Prime Minister, the French
government will be much more aggressive in their efforts to
win approval of the EC proposal.
Although it is impossible to foretell the outcome of the
GATT talks or to precisely determine the full range of impacts,
Minnesotans clearly have a great deal to gain or lose in these
talks. President Bush will face two fundamental questions in
this regard. Th e firs t is whether he beli eves th at it is
appropriate for control over domestic farm policy to be
shifted out of the Congress and into the hands of trade
negotiators.
Second, President Bush must decide whether to stick with
Reagan's plan or to launch a new initiative. Does he want
higher or lower world prices? Will he emphasize export
volume or value? As in all politics, there will be a fierce battle
between competing economic interests over these questions.
The Bush Administration will need to balance all of these
conflicting economic interests.
One factor that could be the most influential in setting a
course for the Bush Administration is the overall lack of
progress thus far in this round of GATT agricultural talks, and
the way this is threatening progress in other areas of the GATT
negotiations. Given increasing congressional concern over
the direction of these talks, it may become too politically
charged to continue down the current path. A more moderate
position could possibly be forged, or perhaps an excuse can
be found to walk away from the negotiations entirely.
Whatever direction President Bush chooses, the people of
Minnesota have a great deal at stake.
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New Rules, New Technologies, and
the Shape of Minnesota Farming
STEVEN]. TAFF

The future development of Minnesota agriculture will be
strongly influenced by new technologies and government
policies that will alter prices for farm inputs and outputs.
While some farm operations will fail under most expected
price regimes, a loss of farmers will probably not have a
significant impact on overall farm production. However, the
new technologies and government policies could shift
Minnesota farming into either a more intensive (less land,
higher yield) or more extensive (more land, lower yield)
mode of operation. A shift either way will have important
implications for Minnesotans. Ownership and residence
patterns, ground water quality, habitat and soil consetvation
effons, and the overall character of the landscape all will be
affected differently.
If policy makers could anticipate the directions of these
shifts, the state might be able to plan for the new environment
or at least buffer the inevitable disruptions. But analysts have
not proven very good at predicting, both because of uncertainty as to which tre nds are relevant and because of
unforseen events that move the trends away from historic
patterns. Consequently, policy makers need to design farm
programs that are individually limited in scope and as a group
are flexible and responsive to changing economic conditions.

Steven J. Taff is an extension economist with the Department of
Agricultural and Applied Economics at the University of Minnesota.
In addition to his Ph.D. in agricultural economics, Taff holds an M.S.
in urban and regional planning At Minnesota, he specializes in the
economics of agricultural and natural resource policies, with
particular attention to the economic and environmental effects of
land retirement programs and water quality protection efforts.
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Context
The Farm Problem and Farming in Minnesota
There is little agreement about the diagnosis of America's
farm problem, let alone the prescription. Some argue that
farming is too big-business oriented; that it uses too many
chemicals; that small farmers are left in the lurch; that too few
people control too much land. Looking at the same world,
others see a production system saddled with innumerable
government regulations, unfair competition from other
countries, and excessive environmental protection
constraints.

Since 1950, Minnesota has "lost" some
88,000 farmers, while over the same
period, total cropland has hardly
budged from the 22 million acre level.

Most agree that there has been too much production and
too little farm income. The recent consensus seems to be that
Americans have overinvested in agriculture, at least for now,
and that there must be a reduction in resources devoted to
production in order to gain a proper balance between
production and income. When economists say "too many
resources," however, most people hear instead "too many
farmers. " Thus farm exit (farmers selling out) becomes for
some a prescription for efficiency and for others an indicator
of agriculture's malaise.
In fact, the "farm problem" is not chronic overproduction;
rather, it is the chronic mismatch of the resources devoted to
9

